Partnerships in Mobile Financial Services: Factors for Success by Aiaze Mitha et al.
1PARTNERSHIPS IN MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES
IFC Advisory Services in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Partnerships in Mobile 
Financial Services:  
Factors for Success
Mark Flaming, Aiaze Mitha, Michel Hanouch,  
Peter Zetterli, Greta Bull
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper is the product of close collaboration between a 
number of individuals and institutions. The authors would like 
to thank Janine Firpo for her contributions to the development 
of the initial concept and Brad Jones for his work on the WING 
case study.  CGAP provided manpower, financial and intellectual 
support, and was a valued knowledge partner throughout the 
process. The MasterCard Foundation has been an important 
supporter of both IFC’s and CGAP’s knowledge and learning 
work, and we are grateful for their on-going support and 
advice. Finally, the team would like to acknowledge Equity 
Bank, MTN Ghana, Tameer Microfinance Bank, Telenor Pakistan 
and WING Cambodia for their participation and meaningful 
contributions to this research. Without their willingness to share 




1. THE STRUCTURE OF MFS IMPLEMENTATIONS: FOUR KEY ROLES 7
2. THE CASE STUDY IMPLEMENTATIONS  
 Equity Bank Kenya: when banks and MNOs compete 8 
 WING Cambodia: when the core business evolves 9 
 Easypaisa in Pakistan: the long-term view 10 
 MTN Ghana: when the leader is forced to follow 11
3. ALIGNING COMPETITIVE FORCES, ECONOMIC MOTIVATION AND ROLES 12-13
4. THE CORE REVENUE SOURCES IN AN MFS SUPPLY CHAIN AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE 
 4.1  Payment Services 14 
4.2  Banking 15 
4.3  Telecommunications 16 
4.4  The Agent Network 16 
4.5  Revenue Distribution 17
5. FINAL OBSERVATIONS 18
AUTHORS 19
ACRONYMS
ANM Agent Network Manager 
ARPU Average Revenue Per User
ATM Automated Teller Machine 
B2B Business-to-Business 
MFS Mobile Financial Services 
MNO Mobile Network Operator 
NPL Non-Performing Loan 
OTC Over The Counter 
P2P Person-to-Person 
POS Point-of-Sale 
PSP Payment Service Provider
SMS Short Message Service
STK SIM Toolkit 
USSD  Unstructured Supplementary Services Data
Executive summary
Mobile financial services have attracted significant attention in recent years 
as a potential means of accelerating access to financial services for the poor. 
Safaricom’s M-Pesa operation in Kenya demonstrated that payments services 
- and more recently banking services through the M-Shwari partnership 
with Commercial Bank of Africa - can be extended to the mass market in a 
cost-effective and profitable manner. 
Many new implementations have sprung up since M-Pesa’s launch 
and regulators have responded by trying to shape the landscape for 
financial inclusion in their markets. As a result of  regulatory changes 
in particular, most mobile financial services (MFS) implementations 
today can be characterized as partnerships. Regardless of  whether 
partnerships are driven by economic or regulatory necessity, they 
have become an important feature of  MFS delivery in many 
markets. The purpose of  this paper is to explore the experience 
with partnership models in four cases, and to extract lessons learned 
for the broader MFS industry.
Partnerships are an important element of  MFS implementations, 
but can vary considerably in their intent and construction. 
Partnerships succeed or fail depending on alignment around three 
high-level concepts, which together provide a useful framework for 
understanding what makes partnerships work. The first is that there 
are a variety of  competitive forces that create the impetus for any 
MFS implementation. Understanding the competitive forces that 
create the incentives to launch an MFS implementation is a starting 
point for understanding the commercial motivations behind the 
initiative, the core business model, the players, and any partnerships 
they might create to achieve their business objectives. The second 
concept is that there are at least four core businesses that can and 
typically must generate revenue in the supply chain: the payment 
service business, banking, telecommunications and the agent 
network. The third concept is that partnership agreements must 
distribute revenues to ensure that the implementation sustains all 
companies in the supply chain. This study examines four MFS 
partnerships using this framework.
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Key findings
• An array of  factors appears to undermine the effectiveness of  
MFS partnerships. The deficiencies typically manifest in some 
combination of  two forms: one or more of  the partners is 
not playing a role that is key to their success, and/or one or 
more of  the partners is playing a role they are ill-equipped or 
unmotivated to play. In some cases, the presence of  what appear 
to be suboptimal arrangements may simply be related to the 
early stage of  the industry and the inevitable learning curve of  
first movers. The rapid evolution of  the MFS industry is likely 
another force. The case study implementations demonstrate 
that markets, technology and business models can evolve 
rapidly and significantly in this sector in relatively short periods 
of  time. Partnership arrangements that appear ideal at the start 
may become problematic as the business changes. 
• To be successful, MFS partnerships must enable the partners 
to generate value for their respective companies. Some part 
of  that value will come from the MFS business itself, and this 
will be a function of  how efficiently the partners can play 
their respective roles to generate value for customers with the 
MFS channel. Additional value will accrue to the partners’ 
core businesses. For example, banks may benefit from deposit 
mobilization, cost savings, and product line growth; mobile 
network operators (MNOs) may benefit from an increase in 
airtime sales, reduced distribution costs and client retention; 
and payment service providers (PSPs) and agent network 
managers (ANMs) may derive benefits from new customers 
in their networks and growth in transactional volumes. The 
division of  revenue and cost between partners, as well as the 
timing of  accrual of  value to the core business of  each partner, 
plays an important role in the evolution of  the implementation. 
Many implementations have taken a short-term view that 
focuses on the value generated by the implementation itself, 
 rather than a longer-term view that also encompasses benefits 
generated for the partners’ core businesses, which may require 
a more patient strategy. 
• Partnership roles in an MFS implementation must be aligned 
with competitive advantage and motivation. The motivation 
and ability of  companies to play their roles are largely a 
function of  the competitive dynamics in the banking, mobile 
communication, payment services and agent-based distribution 
industries. In any given market, companies in these industries 
will have relative strengths and economic motivation to 
operate different parts of  an MFS supply chain. Partnerships 
can add value where competencies and business models are 
complementary; but partnerships may not be possible where 
companies have competing interests to control some part of  
the supply chain or some service component. The challenge 
can begin with the fundamental question of  which customers 
to acquire. Banks, MNOs, PSPs and ANMs may have different 
views on which MFS customers are most likely to benefit the 
respective core businesses.
• Finally, regulatory restrictions are the most consistent cause 
for suboptimal partnership arrangements in the four case 
studies. In some markets, non-bank players will have more 
motivation and competitive advantage than banks, and bank-
based regulation can deny these companies from leading an 
MFS implementation. In other markets, banks with a mass 
retail ambition may have strong motivation to lead an MFS 
implementation, but the absence of  appropriate agent banking 
regulations may place them at a disadvantage. To support 
financial inclusion, leveling the playing field for different types 
of  institutions in terms of  key factors like issuing e-money, 
identifying and using agents and accessing communication 
channels should be a priority for regulators. 
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Introduction 
Mobile financial services implementations are structurally complex, typically 
requiring expertise in banking, telecommunications, technology, marketing 
and distribution. Rarely will one company have the core competence to 
perform all of these functions efficiently, although it is not uncommon to 
see one player fulfilling multiple roles. In addition, banks are often required 
by regulation to play certain roles, and mobile network operators must 
provide communications services. 
As a result, MFS implementations typically involve some 
combination of  financial institutions, mobile network operators, 
agent networks managers and payment service providers.1 These 
different companies enter into business relationships to link all of  
the components into a seamless service delivery channel. 
This paper provides an examination of  partnerships, a critical 
aspect of  MFS implementations that is particularly difficult to 
get right. Companies that are very successful in their respective 
banking, communications, and payment services businesses agree 
on suboptimal partnership arrangements often enough to merit an 
investigation of  how and why this happens. This paper explores 
these relationships on the assumption that getting them right is 
key to the success of  any MFS implementation. More specifically, 
this paper focuses on business relationships in which companies 
partner to create the core business and deliver the customer value 
proposition in an MFS implementation. This implies a distinction 
from a mere contractual relationship with a service provider: 
partners share risk or depend on mutual performance of  defined 
roles for the success of  the implementation. 
The research for this paper is based largely on a review of  
four emerging MFS implementations led by different types of  
institutions, each with unique partnership arrangements with 
other companies that operate parts of  the channel: Equity Bank 
in Kenya, MTN in Ghana, WING in Cambodia, and Easypaisa in 
Pakistan. We explored various aspects of  these implementations to 
extract lessons about how partnerships position the participating 
companies to jointly deliver an attractive customer value proposition 
while at the same time generating value, and distributing that value 
among themselves. While the findings are not easily distilled into 
a checklist for successful partnerships, this examination of  four 
case studies provides some useful reference points for building 
productive partnerships in MFS implementations. 
This paper is organized as follows: 
• Section 1 briefly presents the structure of  MFS implementations 
and in particular the four key roles which must be fulfilled. 
• Section 2 describes the case study implementations and the 
partnership arrangements between the key actors.
• Section 3 describes the importance of  aligning competitive 
forces, economic motivation and partner roles. 
• Section 4 presents key lessons related to the four underlying 
businesses of  an MFS implementation, distinguishing between the 
direct and indirect revenue that can accrue to the core businesses 
of  the partner organizations. It also presents key lessons related 
to the distribution of  this revenue between partners.
1 In this paper, cash agent networks are a core feature of mobile financial service implementations, which distinguishes them from mobile channels that simply 
provide mobile phone based access to bank accounts in an additive rather than transformational manner. 
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1. The structure of MFS implementations: 
four key roles
MFS implementations are structurally complex. They typically require safe 
storage of funds, a reliable and widely available communication channel, 
effective marketing and delivery of payments, and the ability to put money 
in and take money out of the system through a widely distributed agent 
network. Partnerships are what hold the core pieces together.
To understand this function, it is useful to characterize the 
economic structure of  MFS implementations, and in particular 
the four key roles that providers must partner to deliver. 
Companies have many options for how to distribute the different 
roles in an MFS implementation, how to contract with each other 
to coordinate these roles, and how to share revenue. Companies 
may play any combination of  roles, but at least four core functions 
are typically present in any implementation (see list on the right). 
Functions in the supply chain should not be confused with partners 
in the implementation. Individual partners can fulfill multiple 
functions: for example, an MNO can act as the payment services 
provider, the agent network manager and the communications 
channel. A bank can be the PSP, the ANM and the float holder. Or 
a third party can be the PSP and ANM, leaving the bank and the 
MNO to fulfill only their core functions in communications and 
banking. In all cases, a bank must play the role of  holding the float 
account and the MNO must provide the communications channel. 
Other than this, various permutations are possible. The important 
point is that each of  these roles needs to be filled to ensure the 
functioning of  the supply chain. 
•	 Delivering	the	payments	service
 This is the company that brands and sells the payments service 
to the public. It may be a bank, a mobile network operator, or 
a third-party payment service provider.
•	 Safely	storing	funds
 The individual accounts may be in a bank or an e-wallet 
platform, but ultimately the funds are stored in a bank.2 A 
bank or banks may also provide banking services through the 
channel. Banks will also typically settle any transactions that 
occur with accounts outside of  the service network.
•	 Providing	a	secure,	cost-effective	and	widely 
	 available	communication	channel
 Real time transactions conducted at agents or on customer 
phones will pass across communication channels (e.g. USSD, 
SMS or data) provided by MNOs. And MNO airtime may be 
sold across the channel.
•	 Facilitating	getting	cash-in	and	cash-out	of	 
	 the	system
 This often includes an ANM that manages, and in some cases 
contracts, the agents that provide cash and over-the-counter 
(OTC) transaction services to customers.
2 In each of the case studies presented in this paper, the funds are held by a risk sharing partner. However, under certain regulatory environments this role can also 
be contracted out to a bank (as in the case of M-Pesa in Kenya). For a detailed discussion on regulation of non-bank e-money issuers see “Non-bank E-Money 
Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting Customer Funds”, CGAP, 2010. Available at:
 http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Nonbank-E-Money-Issuers-Regulatory-Approaches-to-Protecting-Customer-Funds-Jul-2010.pdf
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2. The case study implementations
Equity	Bank	Kenya:	when	banks	and	MNOs	compete
Since 2006, Equity Bank (“Equity”) has launched multiple mobile 
channels that involve bilateral partnership agreements with all but 
one of  the MNOs in Kenya. The mobile and agent channels are the 
latest component in Equity’s very successful business model as a 
mass market financial service provider. With 7.1 million customers 
(June 2012), Equity is the largest bank in Kenya (measured by 
number of  deposit accounts), with growing operations in the 
region. Equity’s network of  165 branches has provided the basic 
infrastructure for Equity’s reach into the previously unbanked 
and underbanked population. As early as 2003, Equity began 
developing technology-assisted channels to expand its reach 
beyond branches. The rapid expansion of  the ATM network in 
2004 gave Equity a first mover advantage in geographic areas that 
had been largely ignored by other retail banks. In late 2006 Equity 
also began developing mobile phone channels to further extend 
service delivery beyond the branch and ATM network.
The anchor of  Equity’s mobile channel strategy is the bank’s 
own Eazzy247 service. Equity launched the service in 2007 to 
provide bank clients with a USSD-based mobile application for 
transactional services linked to their bank accounts, around the 
same time that Safaricom launched M-Pesa. Crucially, in 2007 
banking regulations did not allow banks to operate through third 
party agents. In contrast, the informal permission that the Kenyan 
Central Bank granted Safaricom did allow for agents and Safaricom 
quickly created an impressive M-Pesa agent network. The take-off  
of  M-Pesa demonstrated just how critical the agent network is for 
creating customer value with a mobile channel. So in 2010, Equity 
entered into partnerships with three mobile operators in Kenya in 
part to access the one part of  an MFS channel that Equity could 
not create on its own: the agent network.
Between May and August of  2010, Equity formed partnerships 
with Safaricom, Orange and yuMobile to create parallel MFS 
channels. Equity partnered with Safaricom to create M-Kesho, 
which is a unique Equity bank account that is linked to a Safaricom 
M-Pesa e-wallet. Equity also partnered with Orange to create 
Orange Money, an Equity bank account linked to an Orange 
Money application which is marketed by Orange. Finally, Equity 
partnered with yuMobile to create yuCash, an exclusive e-wallet 
account for yuMobile customers. 
These partnerships have not evolved into robust MFS 
implementations. For Equity and M-Pesa, the M-Kesho product 
was a bridge between their respective core businesses. The two 
companies struggled to define the partnership in a way that satisfied 
their respective business interests, largely because they perceived 
each other as competitors in too many parts of  the business. Both 
companies have focused their efforts on their respective channels 
and neither company has promoted the M-Kesho product after the 
initial efforts at launch. In contrast, Equity and the other MNOs 
speak positively about the contractual aspects of  their partnership 
arrangements. But these implementations have languished because 
the MNOs are small relative to Safaricom and they have not made 
progress against M-Pesa’s dominant role in the market. 
Equity’s options changed in 2011 when the Kenyan Central 
Bank issued the agent banking guidelines. This enabled banks to 
contract with agents to provide cash point services. Equity had 
believed for some time that it needed an agent network to fully 
leverage its mobile channel and opted to build that network in-
house rather than rely on the agent networks of  others. As of  June 
2012, 1.78 million Equity customers are subscribed to Eazzy247 
and 5,004 agents comprise the agent network. Equity contracts 
with all mobile operators so that clients can access Eazzy247 on 
any network. As of  June 2012, Equity customers were conducting 
25% of  all bank transactions at the agents on the mobile channel 
platform.3 In addition to portfolio and savings growth, the 
mobile/agent channel has also generated significant cost savings 
for Equity, given the lower cost of  the channel relative to other 
bank transaction channels. 
The key point is that, in some cases, providers might be better off  
going it alone, where there is appetite and ability to do so. Despite 
trying a range of  partnerships, Equity’s success has ultimately 
come without partnerships, relying instead on purely contractual 
arrangements in agent network management and access to the 
MNOs’ USSD channels.
3 Interestingly, Equity serves every 100,000 customers with 2.32 branches, which is far lower than the average for the Kenyan banking sector at 4.4 branches per 
100,000. This suggests that Equity’s alternative channels are increasing the efficiency of the bank’s infrastructure. 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5
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WING	Cambodia:	when	the	core	business	evolves
WING Cambodia Limited was formed in 2008 as a 100% 
fully owned subsidiary of  Australia & New Zealand Banking 
Corporation Limited (ANZ), which had entered Cambodia in 2004 
in partnership with the Royal Group of  Cambodia, a local business 
conglomerate. The local bank, known as ANZ Royal, focused 
primarily on large corporate clients. ANZ launched WING in 
2008 as a third-party payment processor, with a strategy to attract 
more corporate clients by offering value-added payroll services for 
employees of  corporations with large numbers of  workers.
WING consists of  a mobile e-wallet platform and a network of  
over 950 proprietary agents. Agents operate mobile phones or 
POS terminals that are linked into the WING platform. Customers 
have the option of  signing up for a WING e-wallet account and 
accessing the USSD-driven transaction application on their mobile 
phones, or conducting OTC4 transactions at the agents without 
having a WING account. WING’s services include cash in/out 
at agents, domestic P2P transfer, bill pay, mobile airtime top-up, 
ATM access, B2B services, retail payments, online payments and 
payroll distribution. Transaction volumes are concentrated in 
domestic P2P transfers and airtime purchases.
WING is a service provider and individual customer accounts are 
held on the WING platform. The global float is held by ANZ Royal, 
and is settled between WING and ANZ Royal, usually three times 
per day. The WING platform is interconnected with ANZ Royal’s 
network to enable WING customers use of  the WING ATM card 
at any one of  over 115 ANZ Royal ATMs in Cambodia. As of  July 
2013, WING was processing $88 million per month in domestic 
remittances transactions alone, and reports that it is now profitable.
The National Bank of  Cambodia gave permission for WING 
to operate on the condition that ANZ Royal assumed ultimate 
responsibility for customer accounts in case of  a WING failure. 
The resulting relationship between ANZ Royal and WING was 
aligned with WING’s original business model as a value-added 
service to the bank’s corporate customers. ANZ Royal wanted to 
build a low-value payroll service to attract large garment factories as 
corporate customers, and WING was developed for that purpose. 
However, over time WING grew in directions that moved it away 
from the core business of  the partner bank, as WING shifted 
from originating low cost accounts to promoting agent assisted 
OTC transactions for remittances and payments. This put pressure 
on both partners as WING acquired a growing customer base that 
was not directly relevant to ANZ Royal’s corporate focus, and 
ANZ Royal became cautious about the potential operational risks 
in the OTC services. This situation cannot resolve completely 
under current regulation, which requires a bank to assume legal 
responsibility for a channel that is creating value for the MNO and 
money transfer industries.
ANZ recently sold WING to Interlogistics Ltd, a Singapore-
based company that also owns Refresh Mobile (Cambodia), which 
boasts a network of  8,500 POS machines and integration with 
all mobile operators. ANZ Royal remains the sponsoring bank. 
Refresh Mobile and WING have now combined their businesses, 
branded as WING, to form the largest payment aggregator in the 
market, allowing agent-based top-up for every mobile operator in 
the market and leverage of  their respective agent networks.
One of  the key takeaways from WING is the importance of  
aligning objectives and expectations upfront (including the target 
market). WING also highlights the importance of  allowing the 
partnership to evolve over time, as the MFS implementation 
adapts to the needs of  the market.
4 “Over-the-counter” (OTC) transactions refer to transactions that do not require the customer to have an e-wallet or bank account. For example, a customer 
might pay a bill by simply giving the agent cash.
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Easypaisa	in	Pakistan:	the	long-term	view
In 2008, the State Bank of  Pakistan issued regulations that 
clearly positioned banks (including microfinance banks) as the 
responsible party for MFS implementations. However, the MNOs 
had a competitive advantage embedded in their communication 
channels and vast distribution networks and they were motivated 
by competition pressures to develop additional revenue streams. 
Consequently, to be able to enter the MFS space, four MNOs 
purchased microfinance institutions, either fully or partially; 
another MNO entered into an exclusive partnership with a mid-
sized bank. 
Telenor was the first to move, purchasing a 51% stake in Tameer 
Microfinance Bank (which obtained a branchless banking license) 
and launching the jointly operated Easypaisa service in October 
2009. The shareholding relationship has facilitated a revenue 
sharing agreement with long-term objectives and a management 
structure that integrates both organizations, making it more an 
acquisition than a traditional partnership. However, there are a 
number of  reasons why this implementation is relevant from a 
partnerships perspective. Firstly, Tameer and Telenor each have 
specific roles and responsibilities. As the business and these 
defined roles evolve, so too does the revenue split. Secondly, the 
regulations ultimately prevent the relationship from merely being 
the acquisition of  a branchless banking license. That is, Tameer 
will remain ultimately liable to State Bank of  Pakistan, and will 
be responsible for performing certain roles. Lastly, like other 
partnerships, Easypaisa has had to deal with the challenge of  
merging employees from two different cultures, with employees 
from both organizations playing critical roles. 
To date, the network has 25,000 agents that are using a mobile 
account operated from a USSD menu linked to the e-wallet 
platform. Customers have the option of  opening an e-wallet 
account using the USSD menu for remote transaction or they 
may elect to perform OTC transactions at agents without having 
to open an account. Easypaisa reports nearly 5 million unique 
customers per month between OTC and e-wallets, with the bulk 
of  transaction volume concentrated in airtime purchases and 
OTC payments and money transfers.
The e-wallet platform is linked to a pooled account on Tameer’s 
core banking system. Customers open individual Easypaisa 
accounts on the platform while a pooled account on the Tameer 
core banking reflects total balances held in all individual wallets. 
Easypaisa offers a range of  services similar to WING (airtime top-up, 
OTC bill pay and P2P transfers, mobile transactions, etc.). 
The bank-led Pakistan regulatory framework may be interpreted 
as relegating the most motivated sector - initially the MNOs - to 
a secondary role in MFS implementations. However, by allowing 
MNOs to take majority shareholder positions in microfinance 
banks, the regulations have created an avenue for MNOs to 
invest and maintain sufficient influence over the implementation.5 
As a microfinance bank, Tameer is also motivated to exploit 
the partnership to expand its core business. However, Tameer 
has approached the integration cautiously. When Tameer began 
operating as a microfinance bank it experienced high non-
performing loans (NPLs). Retaining close relationships with 
customers was part of  the solution used to reduce NPLs from 
over 20% to approximately 0.5%. Tameer has plans to pilot the use 
of  Easypaisa to facilitate loan repayments, loan disbursements and 
savings mobilization from its customers, but will move slowly to 
ensure that the quality of  the loan portfolio is not compromised.6 
Ultimately Tameer also plans to leverage this system to target the 
vast majority of  Pakistanis that are not currently banked. 
In the Tameer/Telenor partnership, the acquisition united two 
mass market service companies who both stand to benefit from 
the MFS implementation. Unlike the WING case, the lead investor 
in the business, Telenor, had strategic and economic reasons for 
being committed to delivering MFS to the mass market. But the 
ability of  each partner to address the mass market was uneven. 
Telenor had the financial muscle and distribution capability to 
reach large numbers of  clients that Tameer was still too small to 
reach, and Tameer had the regulatory advantage of  its banking 
license. Given the circumstances, the acquisition made perfect 
sense. How this plays out over time in the core businesses of  
each of  the partners still remains to be seen, but what is clear 
is that the ownership dynamic creates a longer term perspective, 
given that Telenor will ultimately share in revenue that accrues to 
Tameer. It also reduces some of  the misalignment of  incentives 
that appeared in the other cases by closely aligning the interests of  
the two partners.
5 It is also important to note that the level of investment required is significantly lower than would be the case if MNOs were forced to invest in full scale 
commercial banks.
6 “MFIs and mobile banking: blurring the lines?”, CGAP, forthcoming 2013.
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MTN	Ghana:	when	the	leader	is	forced	to	follow
MTN Mobile Money was launched in Ghana in July 2009 as a 
partnership between MTN, an MNO, and nine commercial banks.7 
The service is branded exclusively under the MTN banner, with 
no real visibility for the partner banks. 
The MTN implementation has around 4,800 agents8 and an 
e-wallet platform primarily accessed via cell phones through a 
SIM Toolkit (STK) application.9 It also offers POS and internet 
channels, though these are relatively more recent and currently 
being expanded. There is presently no card channel. Products 
offered include P2P money transfer, bill payment, airtime top-up, 
balance inquiry and mini statement. Cash out is currently only 
done at agents, but ATM cash out functionality is being developed 
in partnership with Fidelity and Ecobank. At the end of  2012, 
MTN reported processing close to $30 million per month.
Regulations have created complex challenges in the Ghanaian 
market.10 MTN aspired to first mover status in response to 
competitive pressure in the mobile communications sector, while 
banks had not shown an interest in pursuing mass market customers. 
However, the Bank of  Ghana issued regulations that permitted 
only licensed financial institutions to launch MFS, holding them 
responsible for agent network management, customer acquisition 
and individual account management. MNOs are prohibited from 
filling those functions directly and thus effectively from playing 
a lead role. MTN initiated its first discussions with a single bank 
that at least partly shared MTN’s interest in reaching mass market 
customers. However, an amendment to the regulations was 
issued mandating a minimum of  three banks in any branchless 
banking partnership.
The regulation and its addendum were intended to promote a 
“many-to-many” interoperable system, which would allow for 
seamless transactional flows between banks and MNOs offering 
mobile financial services. In practice, the regulations deprive not 
just MNOs but also banks of  exercising a robust leadership role, 
requiring banks to assume legal responsibility for the key roles 
in the implementation, but undermining the banks’ commercial 
incentives to play those roles by creating a free-rider problem, 
as investment by any one bank in developing MFS would 
automatically benefit its competitors.11 And indeed the banks have, 
with few exceptions, been unwilling to play an active part in the 
key roles they are assigned by the regulation. Nor have they been 
willing to invest significantly in product development, sales or 
marketing, since one bank’s investment would generate benefits for 
all competing banks. For MTN Mobile Money, this has slowed the 
deployment and forced MTN to assume de facto responsibility for 
most functions in the supply chain and invest significant resources 
into developing an agent and customer base that it legally does 
not own. Coordination of  efforts across multiple unmotivated 
partners has also proven to be a challenge, resolved only through 
strong leadership on the part of  MTN.
The main takeaway is that regulations should ensure that the most 
motivated players are enabled to compete on a level playing field, 
with regulations proportionate to the risk of  the products/services 
being offered. Regulators must also be careful not to impede 
incentives of  motivated stakeholders to invest and innovate, for 
example, by prematurely forcing collaboration.
7 The regulations required that MTN partnered with at least three banks. The nine banks were CAL Bank, Ecobank, Fidelity Bank, GT Bank, Intercontinental Bank, 
Merchant Bank, Stanbic, UBA and Zenith Bank. Since then, MTN has added the Agricultural Development Bank as the tenth partner bank.
8 Note: MTN does not use the word agent but refers to its agents as merchants.
9 STK “allows for the service provider or bank to house the consumer’s mobile banking menu within the SIM card” (FinMark Trust, “Mobile Banking Technology 
Options”, 2007), and can provide for an improved customer experience. 
10 See e.g. http://www.cgap.org/blog/unintentional-consequences-branchless-banking-ghana
11 Many-to-many means that partner banks will be able to benefit from the investment of any one bank (for example in a new channel or product).
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12 This describes the market conditions that MTN faced in Ghana in 2009. At the time, MTN had 51% market share, substantially more than the closest competitor 
Tigo with 23%. Since that time, competition has intensified and there are now six operators in the market, with MTN dropping to a 46% market share. Tigo and 
Airtel have also launched mobile money services and at least one other MNO is planning to launch mobile money services in 2013. In contrast, the competition 
for mass market customers is significantly lower in the Ghanaian banking sector. The entire sector serves only 34% of the population (compared to 85% of the 
population using mobile phones) and established banks have anchored their business model in corporate and higher income individuals. As a result, MTN and 
other MNOs have been eager to distinguish themselves through value-added financial services but only a few banks have shown significant interest in delivering 
bank products to the target market.
3. Aligning competitive forces, economic 
motivation and roles
The starting point for understanding the economic motivations of the 
companies engaged in most MFS implementations is an understanding of 
the competitive forces in the banking, MNO, payment services, and agent-
based distribution sectors. MFS channels create value by serving mass market 
customers and therefore the motivation of the players is driven largely by 
how much value they perceive that mass market customers can add in their 
respective industries.
The case study implementations demonstrate that the most 
compelling business case may emerge from any of  these sectors, 
and that the factors that give one sector more appetite than the 
others will always be market specific. The case studies also reveal 
that the motivation can shift as an MFS implementation evolves.
Most MNOs are successful precisely because they have developed 
a service with broad appeal to the mass market. Most MNO sectors 
have been extremely competitive, characterized by client churn 
and falling revenues from traditional voice services. Consequently, 
MNOs have spearheaded many of  the first generation MFS 
implementations as value-added services with the aspiration 
to distinguish their brand, lower distribution costs and add 
revenue streams.12
Banks may also have compelling motivation to invest in an 
MFS channel. In most banking sectors, the leading banks have 
established business models anchored in corporate and high 
net worth individual services provided through the branch 
network. These banks may add mobile channels as an additional 
convenience to existing customers and may be genuinely 
interested in intermediating the funds mobilized through an MFS 
implementation, but few have to date been interested in actually 
reaching the mass market with banking services. This represents 
an opportunity for aspiring mass-market banks, young banks 
looking for a niche, and microfinance institutions with limited 
branch infrastructure, to exploit an MFS channel to expand their 
mass-market business at relatively low cost. As noted previously, 
Equity grew to prominence in Kenya as a mass market bank and 
the addition of  the agent network to its own Eazzy247 mobile 
channel in 2010 was a cost-effective move that was consistent with 
Equity’s long history of  developing technology assisted channels. 
Equity had long ago outpaced other banks in the Kenyan 
mass market. The compelling competition in 2010 came from 
Safaricom’s M-Pesa service. Mass market customers showed their 
considerable appetite for mobile payment services with M-Pesa, 
and Equity responded by positioning itself  to compete in this new 
and obviously important dimension of  the financial service sector.
The WING case demonstrates how economic incentives can 
shift in response to market realities, revealing an underlying 
misalignment in the original partnership arrangement, which 
grows as the implementation evolves. Early in its life, WING 
had to adapt rapidly to manage several external challenges, 
which constrained its ability to provide payroll services to ANZ’s 
corporate customers. As a consequence, WING evolved over 
time into a different business model which ultimately had limited 
relevance to ANZ Royal’s core business.
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Key lessons
Market forces within the different industries will largely determine 
what kind of  company will be most motivated and able to drive 
an MFS implementation. Competitive dynamics between the 
industries will determine whether companies from different 
sectors realize a net gain from an MFS partnership.
• Partnerships thrive when the competitive advantage 
of the partners is clearly delineated, and the best 
placed partner is able to drive the initiative. 
 The Tameer-Telenor partnership is an example. Telenor has a 
clear advantage with regard to customer base, agent distribution 
network, communication network, marketing and financial 
strength. For its part, Tameer brings its microfinance service 
license, banking, risk management and compliance expertise 
to the partnership. While Tameer is legally responsible for the 
business, Telenor drives most of  the customer facing aspects 
of  business.
• Where banks and MNOs perceive each other as 
competitors, any partnerships between the two are 
likely to be difficult. 
 The partners will be understandably wary of  each other’s 
long-term aspirations and they will likely not support and may 
even undermine any strategies that associate customer value 
with the other partner’s brand. This is clearly the case with 
Safaricom and Equity in Kenya, where both are competing 
for mass market customers with a large appetite for mobile 
financial services.
 
It is equally important to understand the influence of  regulation. 
The case implementations provide several examples of  
regulations that force a suboptimal distribution of  roles in MFS 
implementations: 
• Regulation can prohibit the most motivated promoters 
from exercising adequate control over their initiative. 
 This can occur easily in markets where MNOs or PSPs are eager 
to promote an MFS implementation under their own brand, 
but regulations require banks to assume legal responsibility of  
the individual customer accounts or services. This is clearly the 
case in Ghana, where MTN has been the driving promoter but 
cannot own the e-wallet accounts or the agent network.
• The lead position may need to shift as the business 
model evolves. 
 Most successful MFS implementations have evolved 
significantly over time. The WING case demonstrates 
that this evolution can change the core business model 
significantly enough that the relative interest of  the partners 
may shift. Interests can be renegotiated, purchased or sold. 
But regulations that confine ownership to banks may strain 
partnership arrangements when the core business model is no 
longer compelling for banks. 
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4. The core revenue sources in an MFS 
supply chain and the distribution of revenue
The ultimate test of an MFS partnership is the revenue that accrues to the 
partners. An MFS supply chain links at least four distinct core functions that 
can generate benefits from an MFS implementation. Partners’ success is a 
function of how well the MFS implementation enables the companies in the 
supply chain to capture core sources of revenue. The following subsections 
explore how partnership arrangements enable companies in the supply 
chain to leverage all of the possible revenue sources.
4.1		Payment	services13
This is the most visible part of  an MFS implementation. It 
encompasses the brand, the channel infrastructure and all of  the 
revenue that results from the transactions conducted in the channel. 
These are typically cash-in/cash-out and payment transactions 
(e.g. remittances, bill pay, payroll services, etc). Revenue is 
generated primarily from transaction fees and commissions 
paid by companies that use the channel to sell services or 
distribute payments.
Key lessons
• The relative importance of this part of the business can 
vary depending on the core business of the company 
that is operating the payment service channel. 
 For an independent PSP, the payment service business is 
primary to the business model, as in the case of  WING. For 
either a bank or an MNO-led implementation, this may not be 
and is probably most often not the case. This is because banks 
and MNOs can typically leverage the MFS channel to generate 
more revenues in their core businesses than they will net from 
the payment service.
• It is important that the partner that drives the payment 
service business has sufficient control to maximize its 
benefit. 
 This is critical for a business model like WING, in which the 
company depends exclusively on channel related revenue. 
However, it may be equally important for a bank that aspires 
to leverage the MFS channel in service of  the bank’s core 
business. For Equity, for example, the MFS channel simply 
allows the bank to reach more customers with an already 
very profitable array of  banking services, but at less cost. The 
bank derives benefits by increasing banking service revenues 
and reducing costs; by comparison, any service revenue from 
channel transactions is barely relevant, at least in the short 
and medium term. The bank may decide to price the payment 
services accordingly. The WING case demonstrates that PSPs 
may struggle to optimize the payment service business when it 
is legally owned by a bank. WING did not have control to fully 
develop the payment service business and ANZ Royal found 
itself  legally responsible for a separate company that no longer 
supported ANZ Royal’s core business.
• The payment service business can also be undermined 
if the partnership arrangement or regulations do not 
allow the implementation to generate revenue from 
customer account balances. 
 This is typically due to regulations but some partners do have 
discretion in how this revenue is distributed. Some regulators 
explicitly prohibit e-money implementations from earning any 
interest on the float balance. This is true of  the trust vehicle 
used to sequester M-Pesa’s float balance in Kenya. It is also 
true in Ghana. Even though MTN brands and operates the 
service, and holds individual customer accounts on their 
e-wallet platform, the regulator prohibits MTN from earning 
interest on the global float deposit in banks on the grounds that 
the funds do not legally belong to MTN but to customers.14
13 The payment service business could be operated by a bank, MNO or third party PSP. It is important to note that this section is referring to the business line 
(costs and revenues) rather than the provider of the service. 
14 Unfortunately the regulations also lack provisions that enable non-bank MFS providers to pay customers interest on the balances in their wallet. While some 
MNOs would like to pay interest, they are wary of doing so for fear of drawing the attention of the regulator by engaging in what might be considered a 
banking activity.
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4.2		Banking
Banks can generate core business revenues from MFS 
implementations in two ways. The first way is to intermediate the 
mobile account balances by lending the funds to traditional bank 
customers. The second is by providing banking services directly 
through the MFS channel. A bank may have different requirements 
of  a partnership, depending on the bank’s relative interest in these 
two revenue sources.
Key lessons
• Banks must be positioned to intermediate the account 
balances of an MFS implementation. 
 Float intermediation is typically a primary motivation for banks 
to participate in MFS implementations. Normally, banks can 
intermediate the float balance whether they operate a mobile 
banking channel and accumulate account balances directly in 
the bank, or they intermediate the global float of  an e-money 
provider. However, the Ghana case illustrates that regulations 
can undermine this core benefit for banks. The large number 
of  banks in the MTN implementation potentially dilutes any 
one bank’s income from intermediation of  account balances, 
and allows MTN to determine how the float will be distributed. 
More importantly, the banks are effectively replaceable at the 
MNOs’ discretion (with 30 days’ notice) and thus stand to 
lose any investments they do make in the business should the 
MNO decide to exclude them from the partnership. While this 
type of  30 day notice clause is fine for a contractual service 
provider relationship, it is clearly problematic where the bank 
is expected to be a partner investing in the business.
• Banks may require significant control of the agent 
channel to deliver banking services to clients. 
 A motivated bank will expend considerable effort and 
investment to develop, promote and sell banking products 
through the channel, but this will be undermined if  the bank 
does not have visibility in the client-facing part of  the value 
chain. Accordingly, the partnership arrangement must give 
 the bank sufficient control, visibility, and revenue share to 
warrant the investment. Moreover, banks will typically want 
to integrate services across all of  their delivery channels. 
The Equity case illustrates the rationale of  a bank that places 
primary interest on using the relatively low cost MFS channels 
to expand its core business. For full control of  the channel and 
ownership of  the customers, such a bank may well opt out of  
partnership arrangements.
 The Ghanaian case demonstrates the problems that banks may 
have with too little control of  the channel.15 The Ghanaian 
banks have little visibility in the channel, which is branded 
under MTN. The regulations in fact explicitly forbid agents 
from using bank related terminology in branding as well as 
from cross-selling or marketing any of  the participating banks 
core products and services. The banks also face the difficulty 
of  distinguishing themselves by products, because any other 
bank can copy a product and supply it through the same 
channel. Finally, client accounts reside on the MNO platform; 
the banks only hold the float balance of  clients associated with 
the bank. Banks cannot see individual customer information 
unless it is provided by the MNO. This discourages any 
significant investment by the banks.
• Banks (and PSPs) face a particular challenge in markets 
where their MFS implementation competes against 
other MFS implementations that are owned by the 
MNOs that provide the communication channels. 
 Non-MNO MFS companies face a substantially uneven 
playing field in markets where regulators allow MNOs to 
house MFS implementations within the MNO and where 
competition regulation does not prohibit MNOs from 
manipulating service levels and pricing of  communication 
channels to protect their MFS business. This creates a potential 
conflict of  interest for MNOs and source of  frustration for 
non-MNO MFS providers, such as Equity. This problem will 
become more visible if  regulators allow MNOs to become 
MFS providers without introducing appropriate rules for “fair 
channel access”. 
15 It is true that most of the partner banks in Ghana are not explicitly wanting to drive the business or invest more. However, this does explain the challenge that a 
bank like Fidelity Bank, which is actively targeting the mass market, faces.
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4.3		Telecommunications
Like banks, MNOs also have multiple ways to generate revenues 
from association with an MFS implementation. MNOs stand to 
generate revenues directly from the transactions that are conducted 
on their communication platform, and generate net benefits in the 
MNO’s core business.
Key lessons
• For many MNOs, the primary motivation for 
participating in an MFS implementation is the value 
added to the core communication business. 
 MFS channels have become efficient ways of  distributing 
airtime, reducing the overall commissions paid by the 
MNO. In some implementations, the average revenue per 
user (ARPU) has increased as MFS users increase airtime 
consumption because the purchase becomes more convenient. 
Finally, where MFS implementations function uniquely on 
a specific mobile network, the MNO may also benefit from 
a reduction in churn as MFS customers are less likely to 
abandon the network they use to access the services. These 
revenue opportunities are becoming increasingly important 
to MNOs as airtime revenues decline. The Pakistan market 
illustrates a trend that is visible in most markets in the world: 
in six years the ARPU dropped from USD9.00 to USD2.50. 
Therefore, forward looking MNOs are eager to add services 
to their network that can generate additional revenue streams 
and maintain loyal customers.
• Where MNOs play no other role in the implementation, 
they tend to maximize their revenues from charging 
communication fees. 
 In some markets, the fees have been high enough to 
undermine the economics of  the entire MFS supply chain by 
undermining the customer value proposition. On the other 
extreme, where MNOs own the MFS implementation or 
are able to generate other revenues, they have been able to 
subsidize the communication expenses. 
• MNOs may need to control much of the MFS channel 
to generate core business revenue. 
 Many MNOs expect to generate most of  the benefit from an 
MFS implementation from the core MNO business revenue 
streams, at least in the near to medium term. However, banks 
and PSPs tend to want to make their channel available on 
multiple mobile networks, and this can undermine the MNOs’ 
ability to generate core revenues. Moreover, bank and PSP-led 
implementations will typically charge the MNOs commissions 
for airtime sales. Therefore, MNOs may have significantly less 
to gain from a bank or PSP-led MFS implementation. 
 The Telenor/Tameer partnership seems to have overcome 
some of  these disadvantages for Telenor. Telenor controls 
enough parts of  the supply chain (communication channel, 
agent network, and e-wallet platform) to be able to generate core 
telecom business benefits. Moreover, their ownership stake in 
Tameer also guarantees them a share of  core banking business 
benefits, should these become more significant over time. 
4.4		The	agent	network
The agent network is one of  the most important components of  
an MFS implementation. It provides customers with convenient 
access to cash services, and this alone generates a large portion 
of  the customer value proposition. This makes the agent network 
strategically important to an MFS implementation, in particular 
to the company that wants to ensure that customers associate the 
service with their brand. Cash agent network management is a 
highly specialized business that requires capacity that banks, PSPs 
and even most MNOs typically do not have. From this perspective, 
a partnership that includes a company with an agent network, 
or at least an ability to manage cash across existing distribution 
channels, would appear to be efficient and mutually beneficial. 
However, the strategic importance of  the agent network to the 
MFS implementation brings other considerations to bear on this 
decision as “ownership” of  agents has in some instances translated 
into control of  the overall MFS offering. 
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Key lessons
• MNOs typically launch MFS implementations with 
the aspiration to leverage their existing airtime 
distributors into a cash agent network. 
 Their distribution networks make MNOs attractive partners 
to companies that do not have agents or any experience in 
managing them. This is the case, for example, with Telenor. 
However, the logistics involved in managing cash across this 
network have been a challenge for many MNOs.
• PSPs may also be motivated to build out their own 
agent networks, for strategic reasons.
 WING serves as an example. WING’s agent network is 
the foundation of  its business model. The majority share 
of  transaction volume comes from OTC transactions at 
the agents. From this perspective, WING is primarily an 
agent distribution company that uses mobile channels and 
a transaction platform to facilitate OTC transactions on an 
agent network. The eventual sale of  WING to a distribution 
company also demonstrates that the enduring value of  the 
company is anchored in the distribution capacity of  the agent 
network. In short, the agent network is what enabled WING 
to transform the initial business concept into a viable company 
with long-term value.
4.5		Revenue	distribution
All of  the companies in an MFS supply chain have to generate 
net benefit from somewhere. As the MFS implementation evolves, 
the benefits and costs may shift disproportionately. Revenue 
distribution agreements are the mechanism for balancing the 
interests of  all companies in the supply chain, and are one of  the 
most important aspects of  partnership arrangements.
Key lessons
• Revenue sharing with agents is common practice. 
 This has been necessary to ensure that agents receive sufficient 
income early in the implementation to maintain their active 
participation. Agents are critical to the core value proposition 
of  an MFS implementation but typically transaction volumes 
 are not sufficient in the early phase to support an agent 
business. In these cases, other companies in the supply chain 
must push sufficient funding to the agents, and may be 
required to wait for a period of  time before seeing benefits 
accrue to their own core businesses.
• Revenue sharing agreements between MNOs and 
banks tend to be more complex.
 The research revealed a range of  approaches to sharing 
revenues in these partnerships. On one extreme, banks and 
MNOs have agreed to simply keep their respective core 
business revenues and share the payment service revenues. 
For example, the partnership may split all transaction-related 
revenue while the MNO keeps all airtime sales revenue and 
the bank retains all income related to float intermediation and 
banking services. On the other extreme are agreements in 
which banks and MNOs agree to share part of  their respective 
core business revenues with the partner(s). The Tameer-
Telenor relationship is an interesting variation in that it gives 
Telenor a share of  the global benefit through its ownership 
in Tameer, regardless of  whether benefit accrues in Telenor 
or in Tameer. This allows for some flexibility in the revenue 
sharing negotiation and agreement. The two companies share 
revenues in proportion to expenses incurred.
• Given that most MFS implementations evolve 
significantly as they mature, the most important 
observation about revenue distribution is that it 
probably has to change over time as the revenue 
sources evolve.
 It is very common for revenues to be concentrated in airtime 
sales and OTC transactions early in the implementation; 
banking services, P2P transfers and merchant fees are only 
likely to grow as the implementation matures. Partnership 
agreements will likely have to evolve to maintain alignment 
between partner roles and their economic motivations, and 
ensure that partners are well positioned to fully exploit the 
revenue opportunities. Tameer and Telenor provide a good 
example of  this, with the revenue split being reviewed on a 
regular basis, as the offering, market and regulations evolve.
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5. Final observations
The research revealed multiple ways that companies partner to create value 
in an MFS implementation. The case studies provide meaningful examples 
of enabling partnerships. However, the findings are equally revealing about 
conditions that can undermine partnership arrangements. In fact, one of 
the noteworthy findings in the background research for this paper was the 
limited number of successful partnerships in operation.
A second dimension to partnership requirements is that most 
companies will want to leverage the MFS channel to generate 
revenues in their core business. It is not enough to divide partner 
roles by their respective competitive advantage or installed 
capacities to implement the MFS channel; companies may have 
strategic reasons for controlling aspects of  the MFS channel that 
are most important to their core business. Alignment of  all of  
these interests is challenging and critical to the success of  any MFS 
implementation.
Regulations are often an underlying cause of  suboptimal 
partnership arrangements. A full examination of  the regulatory 
regimes in the four countries exceeds the scope of  this exercise, but 
this finding warrants a brief  summary of  the specific regulations 
that can undermine the ability of  companies to define roles that 
make for effective MFS implementations.
• Regulations that require banks to assume legal responsibility 
for all MFS implementations undermine the incentive and 
capacity of  potential non-bank promoters. In many markets, 
non-bank players will have more motivation and competitive 
advantage than banks, and bank-based regulation can deny 
these companies from leading an MFS implementation. 
• Regulations that deny either banks or non-banks from 
owning and/or managing the agent network can easily deny 
the leading company the control it requires over the primary 
source of  customer value in an MFS implementation. Given 
the importance of  agents as the primary face to clients, this 
creates a quasi-monopolistic situation that favors one sector 
over another, regardless of  their competitive advantage or 
their motivation to lead an MFS implementation.
• Prohibitions on non-banks earning interest on e-money float 
balance that is deposited in banks denies e-money issuers an 
important source of  revenue. This deprives the value chain of  
an important source of  revenue and essentially transfers value 
from customers to banks. If  a non-bank provider does not 
earn float interest, then they must charge customers more.
• Regulations that force collaboration at an early stage of  
industry development can easily undermine the ability of  
individual companies to generate sufficient benefit to warrant 
the initial investment required in an MFS implementation.
• Where banks and MNOs compete against each other in 
the MFS sector, MNOs will have a significant and unfair 
advantage unless competition regulation ensures that all 
MFS implementations have equal access to communication 
channels, i.e. at a fair price.
In conclusion, while many players are moving in the direction 
of  partnerships for the delivery of  MFS, these partnerships can 
take many forms and are inherently complex and dynamic. While 
there is no easy checklist for a successful partnership arrangement, 
this paper highlights many of  the hazards that have affected early 
partnerships – both in the commercial and regulatory arenas. 
What does seem clear is that, for a partnership to be successful, 
each partner needs to enter into it with a clear understanding of  
its motivation, role and expectations, particularly regarding the 
composition and timing of  benefits likely to flow to it. A long-
term view is almost certainly required, as is some degree of  
flexibility in managing partnership relations over time.
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